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nternational institutions are poised to
make one of the most momentous decisions about the future of global health
security since the formation of the World
Health Organization (WHO) in 1948.
By the end of this year, 5 global commissions will have published major critiques of global health preparedness, all
spurred by the Ebola epidemic, which
exposed deep flaws in the international
system.
The se commissions include the
WHO’s independent Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, which reported in July that
senior leaders failed to respond effectively
during the crisis in West Africa, calling for
“significant transformation” of the agency
(http://bit.ly/1JS5lQe); the WHO Review
Committee on the International Health
Regulations (IHR), which held its first
meeting in Geneva late August (http://bit
.ly/1E5thKN); the Harvard/London School
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Independent Panel on Ebola; the Global Health
Risk Framework Commission of the
National Academy of Medicine (formerly
the Institute of Medicine); and the United
Nations (UN) secretary-general formed a
High-Level Panel, which includes sitting
heads of state to provide political support
for major reforms of the global health system (http://bit.ly/1PgRHIk).
All the reports will feed into the January meeting of the WHO executive board,
with the final decisions taken by the World
Health Assembly in May 2016. There are concerns that 5 commissions will prove to be
costly and duplicative. Moreover, there is no
assurance that their recommendations will
lead to the meaningful and enduring changes
now so badly needed in the global health
landscape.

The Sovereignty Challenge
Although infectious diseases transcend
borders, requiring international cooperation and collective action, states assert
national sovereignty as a justification for
flaunting international norms (http://bit.ly
/1lUq9aZ). The IHR requires states to
report emerging threats and to share
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information. Governments, however, have
hidden vital information. Saudi Arabia, for
example, hasn’t openly shared information about Middle East respiratory syndrome (http://bit.ly/1JfD60q), which, with
the Hajj pilgrimage imminent, is alarming.
West African states also did not fully
report suspected cases of Ebola virus disease until the crisis escalated (http://bit.ly
/1PrWhSG).
As required by the IHR, the WHO issues temporary recommendations after declaring a public health emergency of international concern. Yet, state and national
governments flouted WHO recommendations during the influenza A(H1N1) and Ebola
epidemics by restricting travel and trade and
instituting inhumane quarantines. Quarantines in New York and New Jersey, for example, dissuaded health workers from volunteering in West Africa because of the
prospect of confinement on their return
home. These actions impeded the international response, making it harder for health
workers and essential equipment to move to
and from the affected regions.
Most importantly, the IHR requires
states to develop core health system
capacities. Yet, less than 35% of countries
have met core capacities, and 48 countries
have failed even to report (http://bit.ly
/1NA3mms). WHO doesn’t even independently evaluate how countries perform, relying instead on unreliable self-assessments.
High-income countries have not devoted
sufficient resources to build health systems
in lower-income countries—although the US
Global Health Security Agenda is now investing in capacity building (http://bit.ly
/1KoU33o).

The Challenge of International
Cooperation
Closely related to the sovereignty problem
is the challenge of international cooperation. The international landscape is diverse
and complex, with more than 175 initiatives, funds, agencies, and donors (http://bit
.ly/1KsNeCr). The UN has formed a health
cluster led by the WHO (http://bit.ly
/1FkxD1u), with 32 partner institutions (both
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inside and outside the UN), national governments, and civil society. Beyond the health
cluster are multiple actors, including public/
private partnerships (such as Gavi and the
Global Fund), private industry, international charities (such as Médecins Sans
Frontières) and health ministries, among
many others. And, of course, public health
goes well beyond the health sector, spanning agriculture, migration, trade, climate
change, and much more.
Coordination is vital in health emergencies to ensure that all actors understand their
roles and work cooperatively, without duplicating efforts or erecting bureaucratic
hurdles. Yet, there has been a patent lack of
harmony in international humanitarian operations, ranging from responses to earthquakes in Haiti and Nepal to the Ebola epidemic. The failure of effective leadership, for
example, spurred the UN secretary-general
to establish the first emergency health mission, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency
Response, to scale up the response on the
ground and create a unity of purpose (http:
//bit.ly/15qg8l5). The United States, the
United Kingdom, and France all sent in military assets.
The WHO is constitutionally mandated
to “act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work” (http:
//bit.ly/VFrPAj). Yet, it was either unwilling or
unable to effectively lead the international
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response to Ebola. WHO Director-General
Margaret Chan at one point stated that
the WHO was not an implementing organization, implying that it did not have a central role in leading activities on the ground.
More importantly, WHO country offices reportedly hindered international efforts
to send health workers and medical
supplies.
There are 2 central questions in any international emergency response. The first is
“Who’s in charge?” The second is “Does an
effective command and control structure exist to deliver all essential functions, including human resources, training, medical supplies, and logistics?” As the Haitian crisis
demonstrated, even a massive scale-up of international aid cannot work without a coherent and complementary approach, in
which actors work collectively to achieve the
common good.

The “Good Governance” Challenge
Good governance is essential to ensure
that multiple actors operate openly, effectively, and with accountability, including
international organizations and national
governments. It requires setting targets,
creating indicators to measure progress,
monitoring and evaluating outcomes,
freedom of information and transparency,
stewardship and honesty, civil society
engagement, and accountability—critical
features often lacking at the national and
international levels.
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WHO offers a clear illustration of ineffective governance (http://bit.ly/1I9oY7d),
even though it is among the most democratic organizations in the international system, with virtually all countries represented at the Health Assembly, each with an
equally weighted vote. Despite this, a few
powerful donors, such as the United States,
the European Union, and the Gates Foundation, heavily influence the organization. Major donors drive the global health agenda by
funding the agency with earmarked funds,
which account for nearly three-quarters of
its overall budget.
In addition the WHO’s policies on open
information and conflicts of interest are
broadly criticized (http://bit.ly/1KjvtEd). Unlike UNAIDS, the Global Fund, and Gavi, the
WHO does not include civil society or other
nonstate actors in its governance structures.
Many low- and middle-income states
similarly exhibit major governance deficits.
Often, their decisions are closed to public
scrutiny, they shun or even punish civil society organizations, and resist accountability mechanisms. The health sector, moreover, is among the most corrupt of all
government sectors (http://bit.ly/1fQ7kX2).
Corruption not only siphons critical resources intended to improve local and national health, but also undermines social cohesion and fosters public distrust. Monopoly
power, unchecked authority, unaccountability, and weak enforcement create opportunities for corruption.

The Window Is Closing
I’ve had the privilege of being a member of
2 Commissions and advising 3 others, and I
have little doubt that each will expose major gaps in global health security and offer
radical solutions. But the window of political opportunity following the West African
Ebola epidemic is rapidly closing, as memories fade and as new daunting threats loom—
ranging from ISIS and the refugee crisis in
Syria to energy and climate change.
The question remains whether the entrenched interests of powerful states will
block meaningful reforms. If this historic moment passes with only tepid reforms, we
ought to hold our political leaders fully accountable.
Author Affiliation: University Professor and
Faculty Director, O’Neill Institute for National and
Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, and Director of the World Health
Organization Collaborating Center on Public Health
Law and Human Rights. His most recent book is
Global Health Law (Harvard University Press).
Corresponding Author: Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
(gostin@law.georgetown.edu).
Published online: September 16, 2015, at http//:
newsatjama.jama.com/category/the-jama-forum/.
Disclaimer: Each entry in The JAMA Forum
expresses the opinions of the author but does not
necessarily reflect the views or opinions of JAMA,
the editorial staff, or the American Medical
Association.
Additional Information: Information about The
JAMA Forum is available at http://newsatjama.jama
.com/about/. Information about disclosures of
potential conflicts of interest may be found at http:
//newsatjama.jama.com/jama-forum-disclosures/.

JAMA November 10, 2015 Volume 314, Number 18 (Reprinted)

Copyright 2015 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Downloaded From: http://jama.jamanetwork.com/ by a Dahlgren Memorial Library-Georgetown University Medical Center User on 01/27/2016

jama.com

